Effects of Pilot Fatigue: Are All-Cargo Pilots Affected Differently?

Without doubt, the accident and aftermath following Continental Connection flight 3407 operated by Colgan Air, Inc., affected the aviation industry substantially.  Tragedy of that wintery night on February 12th, 2009, just outside Buffalo, NY, resulted in sweeping rulemaking changes which increased airline transport pilot (ATP) minimum standards of qualification.  Alongside ATP changes - serious questions regarding pilot fatigue, fitness for duty, and flight duty period safety specifics were raised, and then subsequent laws were enacted to impose regulations upon those areas as well.

Such questions however had been raised before about pilot fatigue, yet, were legislatively mothballed due to the decidedly cost prohibitive economic effects projected to be felt upon the profits of industry.  Unfortunately the pilot fatigue issues were not seriously revisited, as historically is commonly seen with safety regulation in general, until after the cost of 50 lives was realized to be priceless.  Pilot fatigue was largely suspected toward the accident’s probable cause – fact until then of which was not fully appreciated.

Public outlash was severe following the Colgan accident.  No longer would the impacts of pilot fatigue rules be deemed, as were definitively “negotiated unregulated” by industry interests, as acceptable financial justification above that of safety paramount.  Lawmakers mandated regulation in the interest of aviation safety with regard to the present danger of pilot fatigue.  Following the mandate, the new Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation 14 C.F.R. 117 “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements” was created.

The FAA “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements” final rule summary first published to the Federal Register on January 1st, 2012 comprehensively explains (2014):

This rule amends the FAA's existing flight, duty and rest regulations applicable to certificate holders and their flightcrew members operating under the domestic, flag, and supplemental operations rules.  The rule recognizes the universality of factors that lead to fatigue in most individuals and regulates these factors to ensure that flightcrew members in passenger operations do not accumulate dangerous amounts of fatigue.  Fatigue threatens aviation safety because it increases the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident.  This risk is heightened in passenger operations because of the additional number of potentially impacted individuals.  The new requirements eliminate the current distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental passenger operations.  The rule provides different requirements based on the time of day, whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone, and the likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances (FAA, 2014, p.1).

Yet, key aviation interests were decidedly absent from the tables of regulation – the “All-Cargo” industry’s interests.  The all-cargo industry was purposefully excluded from 14 C.F.R. 117 regulations due to the expected negative financial impacts upon their business with consideration weighted in favor of the relatively “low” human costs of their business model.  An all-cargo aviation accident holds that some human cost risk exists; those statistically few people that may be impacted by a cargo aircraft crashing into them from above, with of course the added human costs of the few crew lives onboard.

Another excerpt from the FAA final rule supports this rationale (2014):

Turning to concerns expressed by air carriers conducting all-cargo operations, as discussed in the regulatory evaluation, the FAA has determined that this rule would create far smaller benefits for all-cargo operations than it does for passenger operations.  Consequently, the FAA is unable to justify imposing the cost of this rule on all-cargo operations.  The FAA notes that in the past it has excluded all-cargo operations from certain mandatory requirements due to the different cost-benefit comparison that applies to all-cargo operations.  For example, in 2007, the FAA excluded all-cargo operations of airplanes with more than two engines from many of the requirements of the extended range operations (ETOPS) rule because the cost of these provisions for all-cargo operations relative to the potential societal benefit was simply too high.  Based on the cost-benefit analysis of this rule and its past precedent, the FAA has amended this rule to make compliance with part 117 voluntary for all-cargo operations and to allow those operations to continue operating under the existing part 121 flight, duty, and rest regulations if they choose to do so.  As such, this rule now allows all-cargo operations to voluntarily determine, as part of their collective bargaining and business decisions, whether they wish to operate under part 117 (FAA, 2014, p.30).

Decidedly ruled were the nominally lower human costs of an all-cargo aircraft accident when compared to substantially higher human costs of a passenger airline aircraft accident.  An aircraft full of cargo, things, and stuff, was declared less valuable than one full of people’s lives.  It makes good sense; or does it?

The Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA) is an industry group with strong alternate conviction against the exclusion of the all-cargo industry from the 14 C.F.R. 117 rule making.  They contend that the ruling actually promotes increased risk of danger to the entire aviation industry.  The CAPA website has a Legislative Issues section with Flight Time / Duty Time subsection titled “Cargo Carve-Out” – an interesting epithet for the all-cargo exclusions – that outline viewpoints supporting an inclusion of all-cargo amendments to the 14 C.F.R. 117 regulations.

Quoted from the CAPA Write Congress section of the website is succinct message on their perspective of pilot fatigue and aviation safety (2017):

Support Safe Skies Act

An opportunity to End Unsafe Cargo "Carve-Out" and ensure "One Level of Safety"

Revised flight-and duty-time regulations enacted recently for our nation’s commercial pilots contain an exemption for pilots who fly for cargo carriers, creating an unsafe regulatory double standard.  All commercial aircraft share the same taxiways, runways and airspace.  Permitting cargo carriers to operate by less stringent regulations governing flight and duty time makes no sense.  After all, pilot fatigue poses the same safety risk, whether the aircraft carries passengers or freight.

Congress is debating legislation to renew funding for the Federal Aviation Administration. This legislation provides an opportunity to correct the unsafe regulatory double standard that exists for cargo pilots (CAPA, 2017).

Below the aforementioned statement is a standard fill in the blanks of personal information web-form for easy automated submission to one’s congress person in support of the CAPA organization’s aim.  Their website had another simply stated quote that engaged sincere thought for consideration, “A pilot is a pilot and needs protection from fatigue whether flying for a cargo or flying passenger airline” (CAPA, 2017).  What is certainly clear of their organization is that they are strongly positioned in the interests of all-cargo pilots to be included in the 14 C.F.R. 117 regulations.

How would such inclusion affect the cargo pilot population directly?  A good question: One might assume that it would negatively affect the all-cargo aviation industry with a pilot shortage due to the reduced duty times placed upon the overall pool of pilots.  Inversely though it could positively affect the all-cargo pilot population in terms of financial wage improvement and quality of life.  Such changes could result in the all-cargo industry being forced with necessitated increases in pilot hiring, thereby forcing increased pilot wages, by virtue of "pilot scarcity" value.  Passenger airlines are currently experiencing such an effect of wage increases due to regulation related pilot shortages.  This fact may and very likely will be leveraged upon by the all-cargo industry as financial validation against their inclusion in future 14 C.F.R. 117 regulation amendments.

The CAPA perspective however seems to be a winning scenario for pilots and the flying public in general – less fatigue, higher wages, and most importantly increased safety.  Yet, there is no such thing as a free lunch, ever.  Someone would pick up the bill – probably the end of the line consumer of which ultimately relies upon the all-cargo industry’s services.  Safety however should never be considered as reasonable sacrifice bargained for financial gain.

As with practically all regulation, government actors’ ears are effectively pulled upon by those which present the most persuasive interests; financial considerations are greatly accounted into lawmaking.  The all-cargo industry was very effective at these persuasive aims; one can easily find such evidence in the scores of documentation and cost-benefit analysis studies found within the Federal Register website Supporting/Related Materials documentation section of the FAA final rule (FAA, 2014).  CAPA has presented their supportive persuasive interests as well.  Only time will tell which way the lawmakers will sway next and, as always - the wheels of law turn ever, ever, ever so slowly.

– Aviator in Progress

References

CAPA. (2017). Cargo Carve-Out. The Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations. Retrieved from https://www.capapilots.org/legislative-issues/cargo-carve-out/

FAA. (2014). Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/01/04/2011-33078/flightcrew-member-duty-and-rest-requirements