In its wake, the tragic
accident of Colgan Air, Inc., operating as Continental Connection flight 3407
on the evening of February 12, 2009 near Buffalo, NY had impacted long lasting
and resounding effects – immediately upon the 50 victims’ families and broadly across
the aviation industry as a whole. The accident
investigation found probable cause to be clearly and primarily that of pilot error,
resulting in subsequent loss of aircraft control, of which ultimately was unable
to be recovered.
Especially baffling to aviation
experts was that the pilot reacted to an aerodynamic stall situation with fundamentally
opposite and incorrect flight control input response. They persistently pulled back on the flight
control input, exacerbating its stall situation with a pitched nose up attitude,
which only served to further retard any possibility of aircraft recovery to
controlled flight. The correct response
would have been to push the flight control input forward; pitching a nose down
attitude to regain aerodynamic lift upon the wings, whereby positive controlled
flight of the aircraft might have been a possibility. Such grave error in judgement on behalf of
the pilot, and widely considered to be a deficiency of fundamental pilot skills
– basics of flight, was unusually strange.
Further investigation illuminated
findings even more deeply concerning than the pilot’s individual actions and
training history were alone, but turned pointedly toward those of Colgan Air’s operational
standards and practices as well. The
accident furthered reason to consider that such problems may exist systemically
throughout the regional airline industry. Evidenced in following excerpt from the (National
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2010) accident report executive summary:
The safety issues discussed in this
report focus on strategies to prevent flight crew monitoring failures, pilot
professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, pilot training records, airspeed
selection procedures, stall training, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
oversight, flight operational quality assurance programs, use of personal
portable electronic devices on the flight deck, the FAA's use of safety alerts
for operators to transmit safety-critical information, and weather information
provided to pilots. Safety
recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA (NTSB, 2010).
It had become the
watershed event which necessitated broadening their scope of investigation much
wider than initially had been expected – inspections were opened to encompass the
breadth of the regional airline industry as a whole.
Aside from the litany
of safety issues identified by the NTSB, independent personal accounts of gross
negligence were brought into light. The PBS
investigative journalism program Frontline produced a documentary titled “Flying
Cheap” (2010), revealing chilling first-hand declarations by former Colgan employees
attesting to corporate leadership norms of corner-cutting safety to meet bottom
line costs. One interview in the program
references an alleged phone conversation where Colgan’s Vice President of
Operations solicited considerable pressure upon a former pilot to falsify their
crew duty time records to keep flight operations moving. A clear disregard for law and regulation and
safety was coming from the top of their organization. The former Colgan pilot, C. Heiser elaborated,
“The saying around the company was always, ‘Move the rig.’ And that just kind
of told me that they (Colgan) were willing to kind of push the bounds.” Frontline interviewer M. O’Brien then asked,
“Why were they pushing?” Heiser’s sobering reply was, “Because if we didn’t
move those airplanes, they didn’t make money” (Flying Cheap, 2010). Arguably, these latent safety hazards contributed
significantly toward Colgan’s accident in Buffalo. However, latent safety hazards were suspected
to have been systemic of the regional airline industry during that time and not
uniquely inherent to Colgan alone.
Clearly, within any culture where profit priorities are placed above
safety priorities, it only becomes a matter of time before the probability of
lurking disaster strikes.
Public outcry of such gross
negligence quickly followed the NTSB’s Colgan accident investigation. Popular opinion was that something must be
done. Notably this was strongly supported
by mainstream media outlets impressing demands for Congressional response. Congress met those demands with the “Airline
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010” being passed into
Public Law 111-216 on August 1, 2010. A
sweeping wave of rulemaking changes were enacted to improve airline industry
training, safety programs, oversight and regulations as determined by Congress necessary
from previously unidentified deficits. Nestled
within the many changes was the “1500-hour Rule” as is commonly referred. Title 49 U.S.C. 44701, Airline Safety and
Pilot Training Improvement, or as it formally reads, “The total flight hours
required by the Administrator under subsection (b)(1) shall be at least 1,500
flight hours” (2010). Congress’
experience requirement is understood as a response to mandate higher standards
of professionalism of airline pilots who are expected to assure the flying
public’s safety. Many detractors are
doubtful however of the efficacy of such regulatory aim with the argument that
quantity of hours flown does not necessitate quality of hours experienced. An interesting subject best left alone for its
own treatise entirely.
To fully appreciate
questions of pilot shortage, an informal airline brief is helpful. Airlines in the United States were
deregulated by the government in 1978 resulting in an aggressively competitive
and highly volatile market; many startup airline companies popped up like
spring flowers, although, not so many have lasted the true test of time. Today’s major “mainline” airlines are products
of an evolution from heavily regulated and subsidized industry to one, more or
less, operated within the bounds of free market economics. The industry adopted and developed a “hub and
spoke” model of network infrastructure which has become the de facto standard
of the largest profitable mainline airlines.
This system relies upon
mainline “hub” airports which are located near major metropolitan areas that are
“fed” by smaller “spoke” airports located near smaller cities and more remote
rural areas. Major airlines established bases
in the hubs and developed standard routes from hub to hub. This was developed in large part with the
mainline airlines’ interest to service their hubs from the outlying spoke
markets at the lowest cost to benefit ratio.
Regional airlines are also known as “feeder” airlines or even colloquially
as “puddle jumpers” for their role servicing smaller, less profitable markets
with relatively smaller, less costly aircraft.
Regional airline liveries are almost always painted in the likeness and
branding of their mainline counterparts yet operate under contractual
relationship as “connection” or “express” carriers independently. There are of course always exceptions - a
small number of regional airlines are wholly owned subsidiaries of their
mainline “parent” airline. They are
inextricably linked – symbiotically one might say rightly –, interdependently,
mainlines need regionals, as much as regionals need mainlines in return.
Regional airlines are likewise
considered primary “feeders” from which mainline airlines will and generally do
induct many new pilot hires. A certain commonly
understood fact is that a regional airline pilot will earn a much lower salary
relative to their mainline airline pilot counterpart. Although some regional airlines have
negotiated competitive “flow through” pilot hiring agreements with their mainline
counterparts designed for relative assurance of career progression. Broadly speaking, the niche regional airline
industry was almost certainly the brainchild of the mainline airline industry –
essentially developed to leverage maximum profit margins though competitively
contracted, lowest bidder, market outsourcing.
Critiqued though by many for fostering “race to the bottom” mechanics;
another topic best deferred for another time.
These co-existing aviation industry relationships, all things considered
and relatively speaking, seem to be in good financial health as of this
writing.
The backstory until
this point, as long winded as it was, leads to the crux of interest. A hotly debated topic which continues to be
debated to this day – the pilot shortage. What is the pilot shortage? The pilot shortage is the projected impending
shortage of qualified certificated airline pilots; due to mandated 65 years of
age retirement attrition, historically reduced trends of persons obtaining required
qualified pilot certifications, and substantially increased experience hour minimums
needed to obtain required qualified pilot certifications.
One view is of the
belief that regulatory mandates enacted with intentions to increase and ensure
industry safety may have generated an unsustainable constraint instead. When combined with the industry’s period of
financial downturn and setbacks experienced post 9/11, high barrier of entry
costs for training required of minimum qualifications, paired to relatively low
entry level wages, it seems to have become an unattractive career path for
many.
Another view comes with
considerable research support; research backed by The United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO). The “Report
to Congressional Requesters: Aviation Workforce: Current and Future
Availability of Airline Pilots” published February, 2014. The following excerpt quoted from the
Background section is a precise view on the subject:
It
takes many years of training and significant financial resources to meet FAA’s
certification and aeronautical experience qualifications to become an airline
pilot. FAA issues several types of pilot
certificates that airline pilots progress through—including student pilot,
private, commercial, and airline transport pilot (ATP). Under a capacity purchase agreement, mainline
airlines contract with regional airlines to provide air service beyond the
mainline airline’s route network to increase their capacity and revenue. Agreement terms vary, but mainline airlines
generally take on all commercial functions, such as brand marketing, flight
scheduling, and ticket pricing while the regional airlines are responsible for
the aircraft and crews to operate the flights, and provide ground and flight
operations. Federal aviation regulations
establish the core requirements for each pilot certification, including the
eligibility requirements, aeronautical knowledge, aeronautical experience, and
flight proficiency standards. Regulations also govern what pilots with each other
things, certificate can do. For example,
a private pilot certificate allows pilots to fly solo or carry passengers in
any aircraft for which they are qualified, but not to fly for compensation; a
commercial pilot certificate is necessary for a variety of non-airline pilot
jobs. The ATP certificate is the highest
level of pilot certification, requires the highest amount of cumulative flight
time and is necessary to fly as a captain or first officer for an airline.
Airline
pilots are mostly trained through FAA-certified pilot schools at a college or
university—typically through 2- and 4-year degree programs—non-collegiate
vocational schools, or in the military. Outside
of military training, where service members receive compensation while training
to become a pilot, costs can vary significantly for individuals wishing to
become a pilot depending on the number of certificates and ratings they wish
to attain and the school or training program they choose. Generally, costs to attain a private pilot
certificate averages about $9,500, according to the University Aviation
Association. However, the academic
education and flight training from a 4-year aviation degree program to obtain
up to a commercial pilot certificate with additional ratings necessary to be
hired as a pilot for commercial flying can cost well in excess of $100,000. Pilot students generally do not come out of
collegiate and vocational pilot schools with the necessary requisites to attain
an ATP certificate. Individuals will
typically graduate from these schools with a commercial pilot certificate, and
then they must gain experience by accumulating flight time and pass additional
certification testing to obtain an ATP certificate. Similarly, upon separation from the military,
military pilots would have to meet the same flight time requirements and pass
the certification tests as a civilian pilot would in order to obtain an ATP
certificate, although they may be able to use their military flight time to
meet those requirements.
Until
recently, regional and mainline airlines were permitted to hire first officers
who had obtained a commercial pilot certificate which, among other things required
a minimum of 250 hours of flight time. However,
following the 2009 Colgan Air, Inc. crash, in New York, the Airline Safety and
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 mandated that FAA further
limit the hours of pilot flight and duty time to combat problems related to
pilot fatigue and increase training requirements and pilot qualifications for
first officers. In January 2012, FAA
issued a rule mandating that pilots have certain rest periods between flights
and limiting the number of consecutive hours a pilot may fly. This rule became effective as of January 2014.
In July 2013, FAA, as required by the
law, issued a new pilot qualification rule that increased the requirements for
first officers who can fly for U.S. passenger and cargo airlines. The rule requires that first officers now
hold an ATP certificate, just as captains must hold, requiring, among other
things, a minimum of 1,500 hours of total time as a pilot (GAO, 2014, p. 4-6).
From detailed description of industry, well
beaten in, appropriately now comes segue into the topic of
professionalism. Professionalism is an
interesting concept for its many different facets of definition from person to
person, organization to organization.
Personally defined: “Professionalism is lifelong and continuous discipline
of conscientious action performed with goals of greatest holistic benefit and
least acceptable harm.” Admittedly, it
sounds a bit heady and ideal but that is my “Professionalism,” throughout the
future, I’ll surely strive to improve upon it further, that is for certain. Awhile back though, wisdom was shared with me
by a nurse in a hospital, and luckily remains with me still today. I forget her name but this is what she said, “Oh,
honey. What is wrong? Don’t you know? Life is easy.
It’s incredibly simple. You
probably won’t believe it if I told you it’s summed up, all of it, into just one
word. Just one word! Do you know what that is? Respect.
Yep, that’s it. Everything in
your life, I guarantee, will be all right – with Respect.”
With specific regard to
the tragedy of Colgan Air Inc., operating as Continental Connection flight
3407, it must be stated that the flight crew, the company leadership, and even
the regulatory oversight had all lacked in measures of respect – the sum of
which was the unnecessary cost of 50 lives lost. The pilots had clearly been operating well
below standards of duty and care for their passengers – the CVR recordings were
far too casual and conversation distracted from their responsibilities of maintaining
safe flight. Their leadership was
equally negligent in their failure to provide and promote an organization where
safety priorities were set above financial priorities.
It is important though
to recognize that I do not believe that this occurred with intention, so rarely
do such tragedies occur with malice intent – those are specifically evil. It was clear however that a compounded lack
of intention to uphold protection of life’s value was not placed first above that
of intention to maximize financial gain.
Therein lays the
crossroads where ethics and business interests meet; a place where if one
should find themselves forced to make a critical choice, of which may risk life, that they ponder just a bit longer. Momentarily,
pause with consideration before action.
I can only imagine the guilt that must exist in those who’ve in fact
chosen too quickly, without first considering the living consequences and their
choice has cost much, much more than “units of measured value.”
My goal is to stop and think twice before
taking that action.
Do no harm.
Respect.
- Aviator in Progress
References
Airline
Safety and Pilot Training Improvement. (2010). 49 U.S.C. 44701. Sec. 217. Airline Transport Pilot
Certification. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title49/html/USCODE-2011-title49-subtitleVII.htm
National
Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Loss
of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating as Continental Connection
Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February
12, 2009. NTSB/AAR-10/01. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1001.aspx
U.S.
Government Accountability Office. (2014). AVIATION
WORKFORCE:
Current and Future Availability of
Airline Pilots. GAO-14-232: Published: February 28, 2014. Washington,
DC. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-232
Young,
R. (Writer, Producer & Director). (2010, February, 9). Frontline: Flying Cheap. [Documentary]. Boston, MA; WGBH/Boston.
Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/
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