Unfit for Duty: Pilot Mental Illness

On March 24^th, 2015 an Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX operating as Germanwings Flight 9525 (4U9525) with scheduled service from Barcelona, Spain to Dusseldorf, Germany crashed into a remote mountainside in the French Alps, killing all 150 people on board.  Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA), the investigative agency responsible for the accident, later confirmed, with chilling unsettling reality, findings revealing that the co-pilot, A. Lubitz, deliberately flew the airliner into the ground by act of murder-suicide.

Reverberations of shock were felt sharply around the world after such unexpected revelation of the tragedy.  The landmark catastrophe brought probing scrutiny upon the aviation industry’s standards and practices.  Vigorous debate arose in the public sphere of the mainstream media and throughout the aviation industry alike; specifically regarding pilot mental health and fitness of duty and rights of personal medical confidentiality versus those of the flying public’s assurance of safety.  It was however widely agreed upon that industry changes were in order. 

Lubitz’s medical history revealed that recurring mental health issues had affected their flight training and career progression over the course of years.  Of which, most were self-reported per regulation requirements of pilot medical certification, followed as result by medical treatment and rehabilitation for compliance.  Lubitz was declared fit for duty and approved medical certification after each successful treatment of self-reported issue.  However, it was found that Lubitz was not always forthright in their full disclosure of medical issues as was required for their continued medical certification to fly.  This may have been likely due to professional stigma, fear of medical disqualification from their pilot career, and the financial loss and hardship of which would likely result.

In fact, Lubitz received multiple diagnoses and prescriptions by multiple treating physicians for mental health issues in the weeks leading up to the crash.  BEA’s final report of the crash revealed Lubitz’s multiple issuances of sick leave certificates, referral for psychiatric hospital treatment due to a possible psychosis, and multiple pharmaceutical drug prescriptions for treatment of depression, anxiety, and sleep disorder – of which, none were forwarded to Germanwings by Lubitz (BEA, 2016, p. 32).  The physicians were fully aware of Lubitz’s unfit condition for duty; the airline however was not, due partly to medical confidentiality laws.  Furthermore, outward signs of such unfitness were not noticeably detected by Germanwings company or crew.  By industry self-reporting standards Lubitz was deemed to have been legally fit for duty and safe to fly on that fateful day.

The tragedy of Germanwings 4U9525 unfortunately followed an uncannily similar tragedy less than two years earlier.  On November 29^th, 2013 an Embraer ERJ 190-100 registered C9- EMC operating as LAM Mozambique Airlines Flight 470 (LAM 470) with scheduled service from Maputo International Airport, Mozambique to Luanda, Angola crashed into the remote scrub and  brush land of Bwabwata National Park in Namibia, killing all 33 people on board.  It would not be farfetched to hypothesize that Lubitz may have studied this accident before enacting such similar effect themselves.

The Republic of Namibia, Directorate of Aircraft Accident Investigation (DAAI): Civil Aircraft Accident Report: ACCID/112913/1-12 published on April 5^th, 2016 contained details that all too closely resembled a precursory play by play of Lubitz’s 4U9525 murder-suicide:

            Probable Cause:  1.  The inputs to the auto flight systems by the crew member believed to be the Captain who remained alone in the cockpit when the person believed to be the co-pilot requested to go to the lavatory, caused the aircraft to depart from cruise flight to a sustained controlled descent and subsequent collision with the terrain.

            Contributing factors:  1.  The non-compliance to company procedures that resulted in a sole crew member occupying the flight compartment.

            Human Factors: 1.18.3  The investigation team also discovered through the interview (family members and friends of the two pilots) that the captain went through numerous life experiences ranging from:  a)  The separation from the first wife of which the divorce process had not been dissolved to almost (10) years after separation.  b)  The death of a son who passed away in a car accident on a suspected suicide on the 21^st of November 2012.  c)  The captain was reported as not to have attended his son’s funeral.  d)  The captain’s youngest daughter underwent heart surgery in one of the hospitals in South Africa not long time ago (DAAI, 2016).

The DAAI full report supported by evidence recovered from the flight data and cockpit voice recorders validated probable cause to be of murder-suicide by pilot.

One of a generally average understanding and capacity for reason could infer that the LAM 470 captain experienced considerable emotional upsets in their personal life.  Mental health issues were likely the most probable cause leading up to the captain’s action of deliberately flying the airliner into the ground.  These tragedies bear incredibly disturbing semblances and both such have pleaded the questions, “How could this have been prevented?  Where did the system of safety fail?”  One concept which has proven with great reliability, through implementation over the course of considerable time, to mitigate the “lone bad actor problem” – has been that of mutual accountability.

The threat to flight safety pre 9/11 attacks was assumed to be coming from the passenger side of the flight deck door and not from within the flight deck itself.  In order to mitigate the deadly actions of a single bad actor, as was the case with LAM 470, the aviation industry widely adopted “2-person in the cockpit” regulations following the 4U9525 déjà vuesque tragedy.  The “2-person in the cockpit” regulation is very much akin to the “Two-Person Concept” implemented by the United States Air Force (USAF) Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety program.  An excerpt from USAF Airforce Instruction 91-104 publication defines their mutual accountability concept similarly (USAF, 2017):

            The Two-Person Concept (TPC) is central to nuclear surety tamper control measures in the Air Force.  It is designed to make sure that a lone individual cannot perform an incorrect act or unauthorized procedure on a nuclear weapon, nuclear weapon system, or certified critical component (USAF, 2017).

Simply speaking – actions by a sole individual can never be guaranteed free of risk, but risk can be greatly reduced through established procedures of mutual accountability.

The USAF has been successfully using this TPC failsafe method for quite a while.  Thus far, the skies have yet to be filled by an apocalyptic world threating volley of intercontinental ballistic missiles between thermonuclear warhead superpower flexing state actors.  However, according to the January 25^th published, “2018 Doomsday Clock Statement” from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “It is now two minutes to midnight—the closest the Clock has ever been to Doomsday, and as close as it was in 1953, at the height of the Cold War” (Mecklin, 2018).  It does seem that the superpowers have done alright at keeping the keys away from the crazy people… so far.

Of course, one bad actor could still be capable of overpowering their counterpart from within the system of safety of which they’re both entrusted.  Scenario of which follows proposed is notably least probable.  Perhaps best imagined only as to be within a genre of odds which reach toward that of the statistically obscene; two bad actors might entirely give up their ghosts, together in collusion of the worst imaginable pact of illicit evils - dual pilot murder-suicide.  One might ask dutifully, “Why even imagine such improbable ghastly atrocity?”  Because truly, nothing is impossible; due diligence should be continually exercised in effort to prevent even the statistically obscene.

What protects the flying public from mentally ill pilots?  In 2016 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published their Factsheet – Pilot Mental Fitness to provide some clarity (FAA, 2016):

            How does an Aviation Medical Examiner (AME) assess mental health?

            The FAA medical application form includes questions pertaining to the mental health of the pilot.  An AME may ask questions about psychological conditions as part of his/her assessment.  Pilots must disclose all existing physical and psychological conditions and medications or face significant fines if they are found to have falsified information.  They must report any health professional visits during the previous three years.  The AME will use this self-disclosure to ask additional questions about mental health issues.  The AME can order additional psychological testing, or defer the application to the FAA Office of Aerospace Medicine if he or she is concerned that further evaluation is necessary.

            Additionally, if the FAA receives information from another source that a pilot may have a mental health issue, the FAA's Office of Aerospace Medicine can direct the pilot to provide specific documentation and/or a psychiatric and psychological evaluation from a mental health care professional in order to make a determination about the pilot's suitability for certification.

            If a pilot experiences an incident that appears medically related, the FAA will request additional medical information to determine the eligibility of the pilot to hold a medical certificate.  If an FAA flight surgeon determines that a pilot with a valid medical certificate no longer meets the medical standards, the flight surgeon will then recommend that FAA counsel revoke or suspend the medical certificate.

           

Certain medical conditions such as a psychosis, bipolar disorder and severe personality disorder automatically disqualify a pilot from obtaining an FAA medical certificate and prohibit them from flying.  However, many pilots have conditions that are treatable.  Several U.S. airlines already have reporting and monitoring programs that provide the pilot with a path to report their condition, be treated for it, and return to the cockpit once the FAA has determined – through a rigorous evaluation – it is safe to do so.  The FAA addresses the medical certificates of those pilots on a case-by-case basis.     

            The FAA does not release medical records on living pilots, including the results of any pilot’s medical testing, because medical information is covered by privacy laws (FAA, 2016).

The above excerpt is relatively short and sweet when compared to the comprehensive FAA Pilot Fitness Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC): Pilot Fitness ARC Recommendation Report (FAA, 2015).  The FAA ARC Charter was created following the events of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370) mysterious disappearance on March 8^th, 2014 and the Germanwings Flight 9525 (4U9525) murder-suicide tragedy of which brought the topic of pilot mental health to the forefront of contemporary concerns.

For those with deeper interests on the broad reaching topics of pilot mental fitness, the full FAA ARC is recommended reading.  Yet, the Environmental Health article by Wu et al. (2016), titled “Airplane pilot mental health and suicidal thoughts: a cross-sectional descriptive study via anonymous web-based survey,” may pique a greater considerable interest on the topic with its intimately “living” subject matter compared to majority of other studies focused on the “dead.”  Their extensive study wraps with this fitting excerpt:

            Poor mental health is an enormous burden to public health worldwide.  The tragedy of Germanwings flight 4U 9525 should motivate further research into assessing the issue of pilot mental health.  Although current policies aim to improve mental health screening, evaluation, and record keeping, airlines and aviation organizations should increase support for preventative treatment (Wu et al., 2016).

In conclusion: Pilot mental illness issues have a long way to go before society could be seen as to having a healthy outlook on their management.  It is widely purported that a segment within the pilot population exists, which actually needs treatment for their mental health wellness, yet will not actually seek such treatment for risking jeopardy of their career livelihood.  A punitive regulatory environment in the aviation industry will clearly exacerbate problems of non-reporting by those truly affected by mental illness.  The effect of such an environment persisting may only serve to weaken the flying public’s safety and security from future incidents; of which otherwise could be averted if the climate were changed.

Unfortunately, the wheels of law, regulation, and social acceptance grind ever so slowly toward their much needed changes.

– Aviator in Progress

References

BEA. (2016). Final Report: Accident on 24 March 2015 at Prads-Haute-Bléone (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, France) to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX operated by Germanwings. Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile. Retrieved from https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/BEA2015-0125.en-LR.pdf

DAAI. (2016). Republic of Namibia: Ministry of Works and Transport: Directorate of Aircraft Accident Investigation: Civil Aircraft Accident Report: ACCID/112913/1-12. Republic of Namibia: Ministry of Works and Transport. Retrieved from http://www.iacm.gov.mz/doc/AIG/RelatorioTM470.pdf

FAA. (2016). Fact Sheet – Pilot Mental Fitness: June 9, 2016. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20455

FAA. (2015). Pilot Fitness Aviation Rulemaking Committee Report: November 18, 2015. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/2762

Mecklin, J. (2018). It is 2 minutes to midnight: 2018 Doomsday Clock Statement. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/2018%20Doomsday%20Clock%20Statement.pdf

USAF. (2017). Air Force Instruction 91-104. United States of America: Department of the Air Force. Retrieved from http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/afmc/publication/afi91-104_afmcsup/afi91-104_afmcsup.pdf

Wu et al. (2016). Airplane pilot mental health and suicidal thoughts: a cross-sectional descriptive study via anonymous web-based survey. Environmental Health. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-016-0200-6

Regional Airlines and the Pilot Shortage: Professionalism, Tragedy, and Atonement

In its wake, the tragic accident of Colgan Air, Inc., operating as Continental Connection flight 3407 on the evening of February 12, 2009 near Buffalo, NY had impacted long lasting and resounding effects – immediately upon the 50 victims’ families and broadly across the aviation industry as a whole.  The accident investigation found probable cause to be clearly and primarily that of pilot error, resulting in subsequent loss of aircraft control, of which ultimately was unable to be recovered.

Especially baffling to aviation experts was that the pilot reacted to an aerodynamic stall situation with fundamentally opposite and incorrect flight control input response.  They persistently pulled back on the flight control input, exacerbating its stall situation with a pitched nose up attitude, which only served to further retard any possibility of aircraft recovery to controlled flight.  The correct response would have been to push the flight control input forward; pitching a nose down attitude to regain aerodynamic lift upon the wings, whereby positive controlled flight of the aircraft might have been a possibility.  Such grave error in judgement on behalf of the pilot, and widely considered to be a deficiency of fundamental pilot skills – basics of flight, was unusually strange.

Further investigation illuminated findings even more deeply concerning than the pilot’s individual actions and training history were alone, but turned pointedly toward those of Colgan Air’s operational standards and practices as well.  The accident furthered reason to consider that such problems may exist systemically throughout the regional airline industry.  Evidenced in following excerpt from the (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2010) accident report executive summary:

            The safety issues discussed in this report focus on strategies to prevent flight crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, pilot training records, airspeed selection procedures, stall training, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight, flight operational quality assurance programs, use of personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, the FAA's use of safety alerts for operators to transmit safety-critical information, and weather information provided to pilots.  Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA (NTSB, 2010).

It had become the watershed event which necessitated broadening their scope of investigation much wider than initially had been expected – inspections were opened to encompass the breadth of the regional airline industry as a whole.

Aside from the litany of safety issues identified by the NTSB, independent personal accounts of gross negligence were brought into light.  The PBS investigative journalism program Frontline produced a documentary titled “Flying Cheap” (2010), revealing chilling first-hand declarations by former Colgan employees attesting to corporate leadership norms of corner-cutting safety to meet bottom line costs.  One interview in the program references an alleged phone conversation where Colgan’s Vice President of Operations solicited considerable pressure upon a former pilot to falsify their crew duty time records to keep flight operations moving.  A clear disregard for law and regulation and safety was coming from the top of their organization.  The former Colgan pilot, C. Heiser elaborated, “The saying around the company was always, ‘Move the rig.’ And that just kind of told me that they (Colgan) were willing to kind of push the bounds.”  Frontline interviewer M. O’Brien then asked, “Why were they pushing?” Heiser’s sobering reply was, “Because if we didn’t move those airplanes, they didn’t make money” (Flying Cheap, 2010).  Arguably, these latent safety hazards contributed significantly toward Colgan’s accident in Buffalo.  However, latent safety hazards were suspected to have been systemic of the regional airline industry during that time and not uniquely inherent to Colgan alone.  Clearly, within any culture where profit priorities are placed above safety priorities, it only becomes a matter of time before the probability of lurking disaster strikes.

Public outcry of such gross negligence quickly followed the NTSB’s Colgan accident investigation.  Popular opinion was that something must be done.  Notably this was strongly supported by mainstream media outlets impressing demands for Congressional response.  Congress met those demands with the “Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010” being passed into Public Law 111-216 on August 1, 2010.  A sweeping wave of rulemaking changes were enacted to improve airline industry training, safety programs, oversight and regulations as determined by Congress necessary from previously unidentified deficits.  Nestled within the many changes was the “1500-hour Rule” as is commonly referred.  Title 49 U.S.C. 44701, Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement, or as it formally reads, “The total flight hours required by the Administrator under subsection (b)(1) shall be at least 1,500 flight hours” (2010).  Congress’ experience requirement is understood as a response to mandate higher standards of professionalism of airline pilots who are expected to assure the flying public’s safety.  Many detractors are doubtful however of the efficacy of such regulatory aim with the argument that quantity of hours flown does not necessitate quality of hours experienced.  An interesting subject best left alone for its own treatise entirely.

To fully appreciate questions of pilot shortage, an informal airline brief is helpful.  Airlines in the United States were deregulated by the government in 1978 resulting in an aggressively competitive and highly volatile market; many startup airline companies popped up like spring flowers, although, not so many have lasted the true test of time.  Today’s major “mainline” airlines are products of an evolution from heavily regulated and subsidized industry to one, more or less, operated within the bounds of free market economics.  The industry adopted and developed a “hub and spoke” model of network infrastructure which has become the de facto standard of the largest profitable mainline airlines.

This system relies upon mainline “hub” airports which are located near major metropolitan areas that are “fed” by smaller “spoke” airports located near smaller cities and more remote rural areas.  Major airlines established bases in the hubs and developed standard routes from hub to hub.  This was developed in large part with the mainline airlines’ interest to service their hubs from the outlying spoke markets at the lowest cost to benefit ratio.  Regional airlines are also known as “feeder” airlines or even colloquially as “puddle jumpers” for their role servicing smaller, less profitable markets with relatively smaller, less costly aircraft.  Regional airline liveries are almost always painted in the likeness and branding of their mainline counterparts yet operate under contractual relationship as “connection” or “express” carriers independently.  There are of course always exceptions - a small number of regional airlines are wholly owned subsidiaries of their mainline “parent” airline.  They are inextricably linked – symbiotically one might say rightly –, interdependently, mainlines need regionals, as much as regionals need mainlines in return.

Regional airlines are likewise considered primary “feeders” from which mainline airlines will and generally do induct many new pilot hires.  A certain commonly understood fact is that a regional airline pilot will earn a much lower salary relative to their mainline airline pilot counterpart.  Although some regional airlines have negotiated competitive “flow through” pilot hiring agreements with their mainline counterparts designed for relative assurance of career progression.  Broadly speaking, the niche regional airline industry was almost certainly the brainchild of the mainline airline industry – essentially developed to leverage maximum profit margins though competitively contracted, lowest bidder, market outsourcing.  Critiqued though by many for fostering “race to the bottom” mechanics; another topic best deferred for another time.  These co-existing aviation industry relationships, all things considered and relatively speaking, seem to be in good financial health as of this writing.

The backstory until this point, as long winded as it was, leads to the crux of interest.  A hotly debated topic which continues to be debated to this day – the pilot shortage.  What is the pilot shortage?  The pilot shortage is the projected impending shortage of qualified certificated airline pilots; due to mandated 65 years of age retirement attrition, historically reduced trends of persons obtaining required qualified pilot certifications, and substantially increased experience hour minimums needed to obtain required qualified pilot certifications.

One view is of the belief that regulatory mandates enacted with intentions to increase and ensure industry safety may have generated an unsustainable constraint instead.   When combined with the industry’s period of financial downturn and setbacks experienced post 9/11, high barrier of entry costs for training required of minimum qualifications, paired to relatively low entry level wages, it seems to have become an unattractive career path for many.

Another view comes with considerable research support; research backed by The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).  The “Report to Congressional Requesters: Aviation Workforce: Current and Future Availability of Airline Pilots” published February, 2014.  The following excerpt quoted from the Background section is a precise view on the subject:

It takes many years of training and significant financial resources to meet FAA’s certification and aeronautical experience qualifications to become an airline pilot.  FAA issues several types of pilot certificates that airline pilots progress through—including student pilot, private, commercial, and airline transport pilot (ATP).  Under a capacity purchase agreement, mainline airlines contract with regional airlines to provide air service beyond the mainline airline’s route network to increase their capacity and revenue.  Agreement terms vary, but mainline airlines generally take on all commercial functions, such as brand marketing, flight scheduling, and ticket pricing while the regional airlines are responsible for the aircraft and crews to operate the flights, and provide ground and flight operations.  Federal aviation regulations establish the core requirements for each pilot certification, including the eligibility requirements, aeronautical knowledge, aeronautical experience, and flight proficiency standards.  Regulations also govern what pilots with each other things, certificate can do.  For example, a private pilot certificate allows pilots to fly solo or carry passengers in any aircraft for which they are qualified, but not to fly for compensation; a commercial pilot certificate is necessary for a variety of non-airline pilot jobs.  The ATP certificate is the highest level of pilot certification, requires the highest amount of cumulative flight time and is necessary to fly as a captain or first officer for an airline.

Airline pilots are mostly trained through FAA-certified pilot schools at a college or university—typically through 2- and 4-year degree programs—non-collegiate vocational schools, or in the military.  Outside of military training, where service members receive compensation while training to become a pilot, costs can vary significantly for individuals wishing to become a pilot depending on the number of certificates and ratings they wish to attain and the school or training program they choose.  Generally, costs to attain a private pilot certificate averages about $9,500, according to the University Aviation Association.  However, the academic education and flight training from a 4-year aviation degree program to obtain up to a commercial pilot certificate with additional ratings necessary to be hired as a pilot for commercial flying can cost well in excess of $100,000.  Pilot students generally do not come out of collegiate and vocational pilot schools with the necessary requisites to attain an ATP certificate.  Individuals will typically graduate from these schools with a commercial pilot certificate, and then they must gain experience by accumulating flight time and pass additional certification testing to obtain an ATP certificate.  Similarly, upon separation from the military, military pilots would have to meet the same flight time requirements and pass the certification tests as a civilian pilot would in order to obtain an ATP certificate, although they may be able to use their military flight time to meet those requirements.

Until recently, regional and mainline airlines were permitted to hire first officers who had obtained a commercial pilot certificate which, among other things required a minimum of 250 hours of flight time.  However, following the 2009 Colgan Air, Inc. crash, in New York, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 mandated that FAA further limit the hours of pilot flight and duty time to combat problems related to pilot fatigue and increase training requirements and pilot qualifications for first officers.  In January 2012, FAA issued a rule mandating that pilots have certain rest periods between flights and limiting the number of consecutive hours a pilot may fly.  This rule became effective as of January 2014.  In July 2013, FAA, as required by the law, issued a new pilot qualification rule that increased the requirements for first officers who can fly for U.S. passenger and cargo airlines.  The rule requires that first officers now hold an ATP certificate, just as captains must hold, requiring, among other things, a minimum of 1,500 hours of total time as a pilot (GAO, 2014, p. 4-6).

 From detailed description of industry, well beaten in, appropriately now comes segue into the topic of professionalism.  Professionalism is an interesting concept for its many different facets of definition from person to person, organization to organization.  Personally defined: “Professionalism is lifelong and continuous discipline of conscientious action performed with goals of greatest holistic benefit and least acceptable harm.”  Admittedly, it sounds a bit heady and ideal but that is my “Professionalism,” throughout the future, I’ll surely strive to improve upon it further, that is for certain.  Awhile back though, wisdom was shared with me by a nurse in a hospital, and luckily remains with me still today.  I forget her name but this is what she said, “Oh, honey.  What is wrong?  Don’t you know?  Life is easy.  It’s incredibly simple.  You probably won’t believe it if I told you it’s summed up, all of it, into just one word.  Just one word!  Do you know what that is?  Respect.  Yep, that’s it.  Everything in your life, I guarantee, will be all right – with Respect.”

With specific regard to the tragedy of Colgan Air Inc., operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, it must be stated that the flight crew, the company leadership, and even the regulatory oversight had all lacked in measures of respect – the sum of which was the unnecessary cost of 50 lives lost.  The pilots had clearly been operating well below standards of duty and care for their passengers – the CVR recordings were far too casual and conversation distracted from their responsibilities of maintaining safe flight.  Their leadership was equally negligent in their failure to provide and promote an organization where safety priorities were set above financial priorities.

It is important though to recognize that I do not believe that this occurred with intention, so rarely do such tragedies occur with malice intent – those are specifically evil.  It was clear however that a compounded lack of intention to uphold protection of life’s value was not placed first above that of intention to maximize financial gain.

Therein lays the crossroads where ethics and business interests meet; a place where if one should find themselves forced to make a critical choice, of which may risk life, that they ponder just a bit longer.  Momentarily, pause with consideration before action.  I can only imagine the guilt that must exist in those who’ve in fact chosen too quickly, without first considering the living consequences and their choice has cost much, much more than “units of measured value.”

My goal is to stop and think twice before taking that action.

Do no harm.

Respect.

- Aviator in Progress

References

Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement. (2010). 49 U.S.C. 44701. Sec. 217. Airline Transport Pilot Certification. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title49/html/USCODE-2011-title49-subtitleVII.htm

National Transportation Safety Board. (2010). Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February 12, 2009. NTSB/AAR-10/01. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1001.aspx

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2014). AVIATION WORKFORCE:

Current and Future Availability of Airline Pilots. GAO-14-232: Published: February 28, 2014. Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-232

Young, R. (Writer, Producer & Director). (2010, February, 9). Frontline: Flying Cheap. [Documentary]. Boston, MA; WGBH/Boston. Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/

Let's Get Personal: An Introduction

1) How and/or when did my interest with aviation begin?

My love affair with aviation has been going on for about as long as I can remember; it’s been kind of woven into the constitution of my being from an early age, a byproduct of being born of aviation enthusiasts. I grew up in a “normal” suburban family composed of: two parents, three kids, a dog and a cat, riding bikes after school with friends, building stick forts in the woods, and spending weekends flying around in the family airplane “Bluebird” with Mom and Dad. Life later revealed that “normal” was a naiveté of youthful thinking which may not truly exist in any definitively objective form. Kids don’t “normally” grow up with “the family airplane.”  I’m grateful for this abnormality that Bluebird had been in my life.  She's been an especially instrumental gift in the formative years of my youth. 

My earliest aviation memory however comes from an unusual family tradition of sorts. We would load up into the family car and take a ride to a gravel pullover directly beneath the final runway approach at DTW Detroit Metropolitan Airport – RWY 21R then, now RWY 22L, if memory serves correctly. Then we would wait. Landing lights lined up from the distance drew brighter and brighter on their final approach, the whine of engines would slowly build into an incredible rumbling and shrieking roar of turbofan jet crescendo overhead, only momentarily would a detailed glimpse of beautifully crafted sheet metal, rivet, rubber, and hose underside be had, and then the wondrous beast of flight zoomed ahead on track for the runway. Ever so gracefully with two squeaky chirps and two small puffy tufts of smoke, the wheels would touch down and her flight was complete.

As a small boy, I would go absolutely bonkers with excitement every time, and couldn’t wait for the next one to come soon enough. I cherish this history of bona fide “aviation nerdiness” of which proudly I still take part in from time to time as I find it unwinds the stressors of life.  Most often though, I’ll do it just for sake of fun and nostalgia. I encourage you to find any airport, preferably a large international one for heavy jet action but any one will do. Post up under the flight line and wait for it. I am a huge, huge nerd. I cannot deny this fact.

When though was it that I fell deeply into love with aviation?

Certainly, I think that must have been when my father brought me to our hangar and we set Bluebird up with 2x4 pedal blocks, a bunch of old “yellow pages” stacked on the seat, and then he expertly perched a tiny me atop the pile and strapped me in. We donned our trusty ‘green daveys’ and taxied to the run up area – my excitement was practically uncontainable. Shortly thereafter, we took off on my very first flight, in the front seat! That day I knew one thing for sure; I loved flying.

Do you remember the first time you fell in love with aviation?

2) What is my current status, academic major, and when will I graduate?

Currently I’m pursuing a Bachelor of Science Aviation Management Technology Major and General Business Minor undergraduate degree with an FAA Aircraft Dispatch Concentration at Eastern Michigan University’s College of Technology Aviation Program in Ypsilanti, MI. My expected graduating class is 2020 if my current track and progression are maintained.

3) What are my future plans?

Simply:

Learn to fly. Fly, fly, fly, fly, fly and fly some more. Have fun! Get paid to fly. Never stop flying. Fly until the powers that be won’t let an old man fly anymore. Never forget to always have fun! Fly til’ I die.

More specifically:

Develop my personal pathway toward a lifelong career as a professional aviator. I aim to concurrently earn my FAA Airmen Student Pilot through Commercial Multi-engine Instrument Certifications with additional Certified Flight Instructor Multi-engine Airplane Instrument Certifications by my EMU undergraduate degree completion of 2020. I realize fully that this timeline likely needs some rational re-adjustment with consideration toward the sheer volume of hard work and time requisite of this aim. My benchmark philosophy is to always and continuously set it above that of which I’ve been easily capable of performing. Forces growth.

Most specifically:

Excellence in skill is achieved through time and hard work practiced with accuracy and consistency. Paraphrased, Kung Fu.

Fly and learn. Have fun! Apply knowledge gained from each chapter / certificate earned toward each and every next step of my aviator progression with the most logical, beneficial and efficient manner possible. Share! Never willfully arrest another’s growth or well-being. Fly as an instructor, give back – so important, and learn to keep newbie fliers from killing me, then themselves and their families after you’ve set them free. I’ve got a lot of places to fly to still. Relocate to Anchorage, Alaska where I’ve built some really positive friendships within the flying community. Learn to fly bush! Learn to fly seaplanes and helicopters as well.

Realize that I’m approaching that middle aged, flabby around the edges, not quite as sharp or fast as I used to be era a lot quicker than expected. Reposition to a major cargo / airline or otherwise inherently stable flying industry venture. Fly the lion's share of my career there; retirement surplus building stage. Plan an exit for retirement. A life of seaplane island flying sounds like a pretty good end game to me. Most importantly, have fun! Life is too damn short to get all bent out of shape. Be good to each other. Be like the ducky and let the ‘it roll right off your back. Take those lemons and make em’ lemonade. Never take for granted the brevity and fragility of life. Don’t sweat the small stuff and always choose love. Have fun and fly on!

4) Industry related topics or guest speakers of which pique my interest most?

Aviation and the Blockchain: Industry Crossroads – Can decentralized distributed ledger technologies promote aviation safety to levels or standards previously unforeseen?

I believe they can and will, with certainty!

What do you think? Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?
What is Bitcoin? Are you interested in learning more?

Proposal of Guest Speaker: Mr. Tom Sherony – Aviation Site Manager, Metro Aviation Inc. – University of Michigan Survival Flight, Ann Arbor, MI.

He once graciously allowed a personal interview for my coursework. His particular career progression was especially unique and his industry perspectives were exceptionally interesting, passionate and enlightening. If he we’re invited to share his story with our program, I do believe our students would positively benefit.

- Aviator in Progress

Initial Contact: Blogging in Aviation

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- Aviator in Progress